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Race, Housing, and the Government
Nancy E. LeBlanc*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The problem of race and housing is complicated and limited by
several factors not present in other racially controversial areas. First,
the limited supply of decent housing forces the exercise of some selection
in allocating existing housing resources. Second, housing is relatively
fixed in nature and has a long usable life. Third, housing constitutes part
of a neighborhood or a community-a total fabric of living. Finally,
because of the individual nature of most transactions of buying or renting-except when a suburban tract or a new apartment house is concerned-enforcing the laws prohibiting racial discrimination in housing
is very difficult. Analyzing each of these factors in terms of its effect
on racial integration leads to the unfortunate conclusion that housing
has been profoundly resistant to any significant and meaningful change
in racial composition.
First, because of the growing number of poor, and particularly
black, people who live in substandard or slum housing,' together with
the number of old housing units destroyed each year by urban renewal,
highway construction, and other public and private improvements, and
the very limited number of new units of housing built for low-income
families every year,' the demand for the limited supply of decent housing
is increasing daily. The need, therefore, to select who will receive the
decent apartment is always present. If the need of a black family is more
pressing, should a white family be accommodated to promote integration, or should the black family receive the apartment even if this choice
means a totally segregated building? 3
* Associate Director, MFY Legal Services, Inc., New York City. B.A., 1954, Mills College;
LL.B., 1957, Yale University. The author wishes to express her gratitude to Martin A. Hotvet,
without whose necessary research and assistance this Article could not have been written.
I. The word black will be used throughout this Article to refer to all people considered
nonwhite by the white majority, including Chinese, Mexican Americans, and Puerto Ricans.
Although most cases mentioned in this Article involve Negroes, a few involve other nonwhite
minorities.
2. George and Eunice Grier state that only 300,000 units of public housing were built

between 1950 and 1960. G.

GRIER

& E.

GRIER, EQUALITY AND BEYOND

20 (1966).

3. Statistics of the New York City Housing Authority for its Lower East Side projects in
1972 indicated that, while only half the families that moved out were black, 85% of the families
moving in were black. In the 2 decades since original occupancy, therefore, the ratio of black to
white changed from 32/68 to 68/32. Exhibits filed in Otero v. New York City Housing Authority,
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Further, when slum areas are cleared to build new housing, the
people dislocated most often are poor and black. Most new housing,
however, is built for middle- and upper-income-therefore
white-families. The small percentage built for low-income families is
therefore in strong demand by former site residents. Satisfying this
demand, however, may result in substantially black buildings.'
The decision to achieve "integration" rather than satisfying this
demand means many displaced families will be forced into other slum
housing, since other factors affecting housing for blacks will prevent
most dislocated families from finding good housing in the private sector.
Because the black demand for decent housing so far exceeds the supply,
the various formulas governing admission to public or publicly assisted
housing can be used to serve a racial function-either to let blacks in
or to keep them out.
Second, the relatively fixed nature of housing, together with its long
life, means that once housing has been built for a specific income level,
it generally will remain at that level or "trickle down" to a lower one.
Housing is seldom upgraded beyond the economic level for which it was
built.5 Therefore, housing for low-income families built when "separate
but equal" was a permissible racial standard remains, long after the
standard has changed. If the housing was built in large tracts, this heavy
concentration of low-income families tends to create black ghettos because the poor in urban areas usually are black and because the legal
restrictions placed on the maximum income of residents drive out white
families, who tend to be more upwardly mobile in the job market. These
factors thus prevent both racial and economic integration.,
Third, the neighborhood or community element of housing, reinforced by the long useful life of physical structures and the relative
economic stability and homogeneity of neighborhood residents, oper344 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (preliminary injunction), Civil No. 72-1733 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 8,
1973) (summary judgment).
4. The Seward Park Extension Urban Renewal area displaced some 1,800 families, 1,400
of them poor. The new housing planned includes 360 low-income apartments, 200 apartments for
the elderly, and 1,200 middle-income apartments. Only 20% of the apartments in the middleincome buildings are to be set aside for low-income families. Otero v. New York City Housing
Authority, Civil No. 72-1733 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 8, 1973).
5. Sometimes housing built for middle-income families has deteriorated and become a slum.
A later revival of interest in the area, however, may cause an influx of money that will restore the
buildings to their original quality. The brownstone revival on the West Side of Manhattan is a good
example of this phenomenon.
6. The federal government and most states have maximum income ceilings for families living
in public housing and other government subsidized housing. On the other hand, given the limited
amount of low-income housing available, allowing a family that could afford middle-income housing to remain in low-income housing denies a poorer family a decent place to live.
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ates in two ways to interfere with racial integration. White, middle-class
neighborhoods often tend to resist bitterly attempts to build low-income
public housing in the neighborhood. 7 On the other hand, because of a
developing awareness of "black nationalism," a growing pride in ethnicity, and a desire for and an understanding of political power, the minority community may strongly resist being dispersed, perceiving dispersal
as an attempt to destroy the group's potential political base.
In 1960, for example, blacks were more than 50 percent of the
population of central Washington, D.C., but constituted only a quarter
of the total metropolitan area's population.8 If they were dispersed
throughout the metropolitan area instead of concentrated in the central
city, the possibility of gaining majority political control in any community would evaporate, absent a system of proportionate representation. Blacks may therefore fight to have new housing built in their
neighborhoods, even though this will result in continuation of the black
ghettos.
Fourth, the individual nature of housing transactions inhibits the
attempt to enforce integration-if integration is the desired goal. Assuming the goal is integration, the history of public and FHA subsidized
housing suggests that it may be very slow in realization. Mistakes and
decisions made in the past influence the present and future racial composition of existing housing. Moreover, redeveloping slum communities
may merely perpetuate existing ghettos, albeit with better housing. The
forces opposed to integration can throw obstacle after obstacle into the
path of integration and force long and costly lawsuits for each small
advance. The very legitimate needs and desires of people both to have
a decent place to live and to have some control over the fabric and
quality of the community where they live may work against integration.
One very serious question raised-and not yet answered or really discussed-is whether the duty to integrate should override all other needs
and desires relating to housing.'
7. Recently Forest Hills, a predominantly white, middle-class neighborhood in New York
City, fought in the courts, the legislature, and in the streets to prevent construction of a public
housing project in the neighborhood. As a result of political pressure, the Housing Authority
reduced the number of units to be built and allocated a large number to elderly white families.
8. G. GRIER & E. GRIER, supra note 2, at 7.
9. In Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'g 332 F. Supp. 366 (N.D. Ill.
1971), the court indicated that the lower court's order preventing the distribution of all Model
Cities program funds until the Chicago Housing Authority complied with the order by building
public housing in white neighborhoods was too drastic a remedy, given the tremendous needs of
the community. The dissent, however, argued that the order should be affirmed pursuant to an
explicit policy judgment of not enriching the ghetto.
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DEVELOPMENT OF GOVERNMENT-ASSISTED HOUSING AND ITS

EFFECTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

Integration in housing did not become a controversial issue until
the mid-1930's, when the federal government first entered the area in a
large-scale way through the National Housing Act of 193410 and the
Housing Act of 1937.11 Prior to this governmental involvement in the
housing market, the integration issue was submerged by the longstanding judicial holdings that a private owner could discriminate for
any reason, including race. Not until 1948, in Shelley v. Kraemer,2 did
the Supreme Court speak out against racial discrimination in housing
by holding that state courts are prohibited by the fourteenth amendment
from enforcing racially restrictive covenants in deeds. The Court had
earlier outlawed racial zoning.1 3 However, since all housing before 1934
was built, financed, rented, and sold by private parties, blacks could
move into white neighborhoods only when the private owner agreed to
rent or sell.14 In addition, even when a private owner was willing to sell
to a black, banks and other lending institutions frequently refused to
provide the necessary financing. Brokers also contributed to the5 problem by refusing to show blacks homes in white neighborhoods.'
Once the federal government entered the housing market, both as
insurer and as builder, the problem of race became important. When
the first national housing act was passed," the Plessy v. Ferguson"
doctrine of "separate but equal" was the law of the land. Accordingly,
early public housing developments could be-and were-therefore built
on a segregated basis.
A.

Public Housing

In the beginning, public housing was seen not as a part of slum
10. Act of June 27, 1934, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 41, 49
U.S.C.).
1I. 12 U.S.C. § 1703 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of April 22, 1937, ch. 121, § 2, 50
Stat. 70).
12. 334 U.S. I (1948). See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (applying the same prohibition
to federal courts). In Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), the Court held that the Shelley
rule also prohibits suits for damages based on breach of restrictive covenants.
13. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
14. See Note, Racial Discriminationin Housing, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 515 (1959).
15. Discriminatory practices of banks and brokers continue to be a barrier, particularly to
middle-income blacks, even though the Fair Housing Act of 1968 expressly prohibits them. 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-19, 3631 (1970).
16. See notes 10-11 supra.
17. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (state law requiring the races to use separate but equal passenger
facilities aboard railroads does not violate thirteenth or fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution).
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clearance, but as a means of providing decent housing for working
families whose incomes had been seriously reduced by the Depression.
In most communities this meant white families. Large-scale government
housing projects during and after the Second World War were initiated
to provide housing near new defense industry sites and military bases.
Again, this meant that the housing primarily served white working fami8
lies.
Only after the Second World War and the internal migration of
blacks from the rural South to metropolitan areas in both the North and
South was public housing first seen as black housing.19 This change also
coincided with the beginning of a massive infusion of federal monies into
housing through urban renewal. Urban renewal was primarily slum
clearance-which, after the migration of blacks into the central cities,
meant black removal. Public housing was viewed as a way of relocating
families displaced by urban renewal. Public housing therefore frequently
became black housing. One side consequence of this development was
a growing hostility or indifference on the part of Congress and local
communities to public housing programs.
In 1954, the Supreme Court reversed the "separate but equal"
doctrine in Brown v. Board of Education.20 Earlier, several cases had
held that intentional segregation by a public housing authority was
unconstitutional; these cases, however, involved explicit denials of admission to public housing because of race2 ' and did not lead to significant change in housing policies, since the tenantry of public housing
usually follows the existing racial pattern of the community or neighborhood in which the housing is located. By deciding where to build a
project, the resulting racial composition could therefore be determined
fairly well without specific rules barring whites or blacks. In addition,
preferences often were-and still are-established for people living
within a given radius of the project. This policy was particularly important in excluding blacks from projects built in basically white neighbor18.

For a discussion of the development of public housing see L. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT
(1968).
19. During the 1950-1960 period, the nation's 15 largest metropolitan areas registered larger
increases in black than white population, and the black percentage of Washington, Baltimore, New
Orleans, Philadelphia, Detroit, Cleveland, and St. Louis rose to between 25 and 50% of the total
population. G. GRIER & E. GRIER, supra note 2, at 6-7.
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (state laws requiring segregation of children in public schools solely
on the basis of race violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment).
21. Vann v. Metropolitan Housing Authority, 113 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ohio 1953); Banks
v. Housing Authority, 120 Cal. App. 2d I, 260 P.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
974 (1954). Since Brown, all state appellate and federal courts have denied the existence of state
power to segregate. See Note, supra note 14, at 518.
AND SLUM HOUSING

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

hoods. Whites normally refuse to move voluntarily into black neighborhoods.
When it became apparent that a policy statement prohibiting racial
discrimination in public housing would not result in integrated housing,
more affirmative steps were taken by the Executive and then by Congress. In 1962, President Kennedy issued Executive Order 1106322 banning racial discrimination in all federal programs. Two years later, the
Executive Order was superseded in large part by enactment of Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.23

Pursuant to the Executive Order of 1962 and the Housing Act of
1964,24 the Public Housing Administration (PHA) required local housing authorities to follow one of two alternate plans for ensuring integration. The "Free Choice" plan, which gives each applicant his choice of
any project, theoretically results in many blacks choosing projects in
white neighborhoods and many whites choosing projects in black neighborhoods. Unfortunately, the latter is rarely the case. The second, or
"First Come, First Served" plan, which assigns applicants to the first
available apartment, should by the law of averages produce integration;
many whites, however, simply will not accept an apartment in a project
in a black neighborhood. While these plans resulted in a certain amount
of token integration in projects in white or mixed neighborhoods, 25 projects built in black neighborhoods-the majority of all projects26
remained black.
Discrimination in housing was addressed specifically by Congress
with the enactment of the Fair Housing Act of 1968,2 which prohibits
racial discrimination in the sale or rental of residential housing and
requires the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to "administer the programs and activities relating to
housing and urban development in a manner affirmatively to further the
policies of this subchapter." Regulations implementing the Executive
Order, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968
22. 3 C.F.R. § 652 (1959-63 comp.). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1970) (prohibiting discrimination in any public benefit program).
24. Act of Sept. 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-560, 78 Stat. 769 (codified in scattered sections of
12, 15, 38, 42 U.S.C.).
25. HUD defined integration, at least for purposes of its statistics, as one or more blacks in
a white building.
26. Note, Public Housing and Integration:A Neglected Opportunity,6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PRoa. 253, 256 (1970).
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19, 3631 (1970).
28. Id. § 3608(d)(5).
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lay the burden of enforcement explicitly upon HUD 29 by requiring extensive reports from local agencies and compliance investigations.

Moreover, the regulations prohibit discrimination in both tenant and
site selection.
Site selection is now the most crucial factor in determining whether
public housing will be segregated and whether poor blacks will have an
opportunity to live in white neighborhoods. Among the numerous suits
challenging various aspects of the site selection process, some have
involved attempts to prevent a local housing authority from building

new housing on sites within existing black communities. The courts have
held that building exclusively or almost entirely in black neighborhoods
constitutes discrimination and have required planners to build in white

or mixed neighborhoods at the same time, or before, more projects are
built in black neighborhoods.30
In Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority3 and its companion
case, Gautreaux v. Romney,3 2 the Seventh Circuit found that the Chi-

cago Housing Authority (CHA) had intentionally maintained a system
of public housing that discriminated racially in site selection. Almost all
family units operated by CHA were in neighborhoods between 50 to 100
percent black, a situation that resulted in limiting interest in public
housing to blacks, who comprised 90 percent of the waiting list. The

court prohibited CHA from constructing any units in the Limited Public
Housing Area (census tracts with 30 percent or more nonwhite population) until 700 units were built in a General Public Housing Area (the
29. HUD replaced PHA as the administration of public housing in 1965. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 3534 (1970).
30. In Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969), the court granted a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the Bogalusa Housing Authority from building public housing in black
neighborhoods until alternate locations in white neighborhoods were shown to be unavailable, and
in Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972), the court prohibited the Cuyahoga
Metropolitan Housing Authority (Cleveland, Ohio) from building any public housing in black
neighborhoods of the city.
In Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970), HUD was ordered to assess the racial
concentration effects of rent supplement payments upon an apartment project by adopting "some
adequate institutional means" to marshall all facts relevant to determining racial impact. In
response to the judgment order in Shannon and other cases, HUD has issued comprehensive new
regulations governing site selection. 37 Fed. Reg. 203-09 (1972). HUD has tried to resolve the
conflict between residential segregation and housing need. For a comprehensive, up-to-date discussion of the new regulations and the discrimination problem see Maxwell, HUD's Project Selection
Criteria-A Cure for "Impermissible Color Blindness," 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 92 (1972) (the
author is HUD's General Counsel).
31. 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. I11.), 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. I11.
1969),supplementalorderaff'd,
436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971).
32. 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir.), 332 F. Supp. 366 (N.D. III. 1971) (judgment order on remand),
rev'd, 457 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1972).
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remainder of the city). Seventy-five percent of all units built thereafter

were to be placed in the General Public Housing Area.
Other cases have been brought to force authorities to grant necessary building or other permits to allow low-income projects to be built
in predominantly white areas.33 It should be noted that when local
housing authorities have been able to show a plan to build in both white

and black areas, the courts have held that building projects in black
34
neighborhoods is not discriminatory.
Neither the cases, the statutes, nor the regulations, however, have

furnished any guidelines on the proper racial composition of projects or
individual buildings. Therefore, while the site selection cases imply that
integration will be promoted by placing a public housing project in a
mixed or white neighborhood, none mentions the constitutional ques-

tions stemming from the project's being all or mostly black. Earlier
studies indicated that the racial composition of a project tends to follow
that of the neighborhood in which it is located. Since a large percentage
of families eligible or on waiting lists is black, new projects may become

35
black ghettos within white communities.
Otero v. New York City Housing Authority,31 an action brought
by tenants-most of whom were black-dislocated by an Urban Re-

newal project to force the Housing Authority to honor their placement
priority to an apartment built in the Renewal area, directly raised the
33. See, e.g., Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970)
(private project); Sisters of Providence of St. Mary of the Woods v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp.
396 (N.D. I11.1971) (zoning changes); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd,
457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972).
34. In Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), the court dismissed counts of the
complaint against the Atlanta Housing Authority when the Authority showed that over 93% of all
proposed units were for areas having a population between 80 and 90% white. In Croskey Street
Concerned Citizens v. Romney, 459 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1972), aff'g 335 F. Supp. 1251 (E.D. Pa.
1971), the court upheld construction of 313 low-rent units in a black area when 360 units scheduled
for a white area were part of the same package. See Maxwell, note 30 supra.
35. In Gautreaux, the order limited both the maximum unit size and maximum floor utilization of future projects. Moreover, projects may not constitute more than 15% of the total apartments and single-family residences in any census tract. "These provisions, limiting the size and
concentration of future projects, are apparently designed to assure stable integration of new housing into the larger white community." Note, Public Housing and Urban Policy: Gautreaux v.
Chicago Housing Authority, 79 YALE L.J. 712, 720 (1970). The idea that the projects will be almost
all black is implicit. It had not been disputed at trial that aldermen to whom proposed sites were
submitted for preclearance under the particular system used in Chicago vetoed sites in white areas
because the 90% Negro waiting list and occupancy rate would create a concentrated black population in the white areas. 436 F.2d at 307-08.
36. 344 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (preliminary injunction), Civil No. 72-1733
(S.D.N.Y., Feb. 8, 1973) (summary judgment for plaintiffs). See section III C infra.
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issue of the degree of integration required in a public housing building.
The project in question was immediately surrounded by white middleclass buildings in turn surrounded by a larger mixed, but predominantly
black slum. The Authority refused to let most former site tenants move
back because admitting them would make the project over 80 percent
nonwhite, a situation that, according to the Authority, would violate its
affirmative duty to integrate. The former site tenants contended that
their right to return took precedence over the affirmative duty to integrate, and further, even if the duty to integrate should predominate, that
a building 80 percent nonwhite is integrated. The former tenants also
argued that even if the building is totally black, its location in a white
community meets the requirement of the affirmative duty to integrate.
The district court granted the former tenants' motion for summary
judgment."
Although Otero raises several problems in defining "integration,"
the law is clear that public housing authorities have an affirmative duty
to "integrate," both in admitting tenants into public housing facilities
and in selecting sites in areas other than black neighborhoods.
B.

Federally Assisted Housing

The National Housing Act of 1934 established a system of mortgage insurance for private owners administered by the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA). The mortgage guarantees are available to individual home owners and builder-developers of multifamily projects.38
Based on the assumption that economic stability requires racially and
economically homogeneous neighborhoods, the FHA initially adopted
policies that effectively blocked black entry into white neighborhoods.
Appraisers were told that "if a neighborhood is to retain stability it is
necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied by the same
social and racial classes." 9 The FHA deemed restrictive covenants the
best protection against eventual neighborhood invasions by "incompatible groups." Such covenants were recommended for "all land in the
immediate environment of the subject location."4 0
By adopting racially restrictive covenants and their underlying ideology, the FHA helped to create a movement that was to make white
suburban areas essentially unavailable to minorities. Thus black fami37.
38.
(Jan. 28,
39.
40.

Civil No. 72-1733 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 8, 1973).
National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (1970). See Executive Order No. 7280,
1936).
FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, UNDERWRITING MANUAL §§ 937, 980 (1938).
Id.
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lies searching for better housing were forced to seek out existing black
communities-usually in the central city-rather than moving into the
suburbs or the central city white communities since most needed FHA
or VA mortgages to buy a house. As a result, communities tended to
retain their existing segregated racial composition, and the natural integration that might have occurred because of increasing black economic
entry into the middle class failed to materialize.
In the last two and a half decades, however, the FHA's original
bluntly segregationist policies have given way, in the face of Supreme
Court decisions and federal legislation that culminated in the Fair
Housing Act of 1968 and its implementing regulations," to a policy of
strong support for open housing.42 The extent of FHA43 enforcement
of statutes and regulations against discrimination, however, is questionable, for the FHA merely insures mortgages made by banks and other
financial organizations and can therefore hide behind discriminatory
policies of the primary lending institutions. Analyzing enforcement of
FHA policies and guidelines is complicated further by the individual
nature of mortgage requests: refusals may be predicated ostensibly upon
the applicant's job, salary, other financial resources, credit standing, etc.
When an applicant seeks mortgage money to purchase an older house,
the house itself is deemed unique. Because of these and other factors,
pointing to racial discrimination in given cases becomes very difficult.
When developers advertise that FHA financing is available for a large
tract of homes, however, at least the condition of the house is eliminated
as an obstacle to showing discrimination. Patterns of racial discrimination are also more discernible.
Although the FHA had the power under Executive Order 11063 to
invoke sanctions against builders practicing racial discrimination, it
never exercised this power prior to 1968. Reasoning that imposing sanctions would merely turn builders to conventional market financing, the
FHA saw the exercise of its powers as inconsistent with aiding the
home-building industry-its ultimate constituency-and maintaining
the FHA financing market share-its primary goal."
41. 24 C.F.R. § 200.300 et seq. (1972).
42. For detailed treatment of the development of FHA programs and their effects see G.
GRIER & E. GRIER, supra note 2; D. MCENTIRE, RESIDENCE AND RACE (1960); Hill, Demographic
Change and Racial Ghettos: The Crisisof American Cities, 44 J. URBAN L. 231 (1967). For case
studies of difficulties encountered in the development of interracial housing see G. GRIER & E.
GRIER, PRIVATELY DEVELOPED INTERRACIAL HOUSING (1960).
43. FHA became a part of the Housing and Urban Development Department (HUD) in
1965. Act of Sept. 9, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-174, § 5(a), 79 Stat. 669.
44. Schwelb, From Illusion to Reality-Reliefin Civil Rights Cases,48 NOTRE DAME LAW.
49, 68-75 (1972).
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Passage of the Fair Housing Act of 196811 has not substantially
changed the situation. Sponsors of federally assisted projects are now

required to certify that they will not discriminate for racial reasons, but
the FHA has not taken direct action to enforce the no-discrimination
rule. Despite elaborate provisions and safeguards in the Fair Housing
Act, therefore, very little real integration in federally assisted housing
has occurred by reason of governmental pressure; willing and commit-

ted private owners account for most improvements in racial balance.
As has been indicated, however, even dedicated enforcement would
not have been totally effective, for few nonwhite families have been able
to meet government-imposed credit standards at new private housing

price levels.4" The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, however, has attempted to meet this problem by liberalizing the standards

for obtaining FHA backing and by lifting eligibility restrictions on insuring housing in declining neighborhoods. 7
Legislation has also been enacted to encourage private develop-

ment of low-income, multifamily housing. The section 221(d)(3) program, begun in 1961, authorizes three percent loans to limited-profit

and nonprofit developers of housing for the poor." The section 236
program, enacted in 1968, lowers rentals to a level consonant with
construction of the project under a one percent mortgage.49 Although
units built under these programs fall under the positive commitment to

integration initially established by the 1962 Executive Order, because of
higher construction costs most section 221(d)(3) and 236 projects actually serve moderate-income families, with 20 to 30 percent of the

apartments set aside for low-income families, under additional separate
subsidies. ° Accordingly, integration in these buildings is often a mixture
of the black poor with middle-income whites.
45. The Fair Housing Act of 1968 made discrimination by institutions financing housing
illegal. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1970). Discrimination in the provision of brokerage services was also
prohibited. 42 U.S.C. § 3606 (1970). While the law prohibits discrimination by large-scale sellers
or renters of housing, single-family home owners and renters of 3 or fewer aparlments are exempted from coverage. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3603(b), 3604 (1970). In 1968, the Supreme Court ruled that
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970), outlawed all discrimination in the sale or
rental of property, including purely private discrimination. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409 (1968). See also Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (refusal to approve
assignment of membership share in a park, which was integral part of a lease, on racially discriminatory grounds held violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1982).
46. G. GRIER & E. GRIER, supra note 2, at 64-65.
47. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1715z-2 to -3 (1970).
48. 12 U.S.C. § 17151 (1970).
49. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-l(c) (1970).
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 1431b (1970).
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Zoning

Although the Supreme Court ruled in 1917 that racially motivated
discriminatory zoning is unconstitutional," zoning-a generally valid
exercise of the state police power12-remains one of the most important
factors inhibiting the growth of integrated housing. As federal and
sometimes state funding became available to build new housing for lowincome-thus predominantly black-families, 3 communities enacted
zoning regulations to make it virtually impossible to build low-income
54
housing.
Zoning regulations normally attempt to keep a community white
by limiting developments to middle- and luxury-class housing. The reasons put forward to justify these restrictions include the needs to preserve the tax base, to prevent the schools from becoming over-crowded,
to avoid overburdening of other community facilities, and to preserve
the essential character of the particular community, i.e. the status quo
for the people who are already there.
Zoning regulations vary from single-family residence and minimum acreage requirements to complex master plans that provide detailed regulation of the pace of development and specify particular areas
where residences, factories, or multifamily projects may be built. Minimum acreage and single-family residence requirements keep out all
apartments, regardless of income levels. Minimum room size requirements, on the other hand, exclude lower income groups by making
houses or apartments too expensive to rent and too costly for FHA
financing criteria, particularly in the 221 (d)(3) and 236 programs, which
are aimed at low- and moderate-income housing. 5
51. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (city ordinance held violative of property
owner's fourteenth amendment right to dispose of his property to any constitutionally qualified
purchaser).
52. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The standard of proof
required in Euclid, the first Supreme Court decision on the validity of zoning under the equal
protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment, has unfortunately proven a
continuing hindrance to subsequent attempts to invalidate zoning regulations as unreasonable
exercises of the states' police powers.
53. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1715l(d)(3), z, z-1 (1970).
54. For example, 90% of the vacant land in the New York Metropolitan Area is zoned for
single-family residences, and 2/3 of this land requires lot sizes of 1/2 acre or more. Forty percent
of the land within mass transit commuting distance of New York City is zoned for 4-or-more-acre.
lots. In Connecticut, 50% of the vacant residential land in the entire state is zoned for one- or 2acre lots. Roberts, The Demise of Property Law, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 22-23 (1971). For a
general discussion of exclusionary zoning tactics see Bigham & Bostick, Exclusionary Zoning
Practices: An Examination of the Current Controversy, 25 VAND. L. REV. 1111 (1972).
55. The court in Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. II,
283 A.2d 353 (1971), for example, held floor space and lot size limitations unconstitutional. The
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Complex master plans may delay low-income housing for long
periods, if the locality's plans call for long-range capital improvements
before additional housing may be constructed. For example, the master
plan of the town of Ramapo in New York State provides for orderly
development by phasing residential development to the town's ability to
provide sewers, parks and schools, roads, firehouses and drainage facilities. The plan was adopted to prevent urban sprawl and to eliminate
premature subdivisions. An eighteen-year period was allowed for the
building of necessary improvements. When the plan was challenged as
unreasonably exclusionary in Golden v. Planning Board," the New
York Court of Appeals upheld the law. Although the majority recognized the pressing need for housing, its decision accorded greater weight
to the need for orderly growth. Judge Breitel dissented strongly, arguing
that housing needs are so great that requiring construction to await
completion of the town's plan for capital improvements was unreasonable.
Recently, however, other courts have responded to the nation's
housing shortage by striking down exclusionary zoning laws. In
National Land & Investment Co. v. Easttown Board of Adjustment,57
for example, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania struck down a fouracre lot limitation, holding that a zoning regulation may not be used to
prevent people from satisfying their need for a decent place to live,
despite the future burdens upon public services and facilities that would
necessarily be imposed. 8 The same court has subsequently relied on
National Land in invalidating two- and three-acre requirements "9 and,
more importantly, in abolishing a zoning scheme that prevented the
building of apartments."
These decisions do not necessarily presage universal judicial support for the right of poor people to overcome exclusionary zoning,
however, because the Pennsylvania court expressly stated that a community can adopt a plan for its orderly growth provided that a valid
basis exists for the guidelines and restrictions made in the plan. 1 Moreover, although the Golden court previously had struck down a simple
zoning requirements had made about 8,000 acres unavailable for low- or moderate-income housing
developments.
56. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
57. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
58. Id. at 528, 215 A.2d at 612.
59. In re Concord Township, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
60. In re Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
61. In re Concord Township, 439 Pa. 466,475, 268 A.2d 765, 769 (1970) (citing In re Village
2 at New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968) (upholding a plan)).
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zoning regulation prohibiting multiple dewellings. 2 When presented
with a master plan allowing growth, but in an "orderly" fashion, however-thus effectively excluding low- and moderate-income housing for
many years-the court upheld the regulations. 3
In this context, judicial opinions in Michigan and New Jersey are
especially significant. The Michigan Court of Appeals, in Bristow v.
City of Woodhaven,64 invalidated zoning that limited use of land to
single-family residences and prohibited trailer parks. Recognizing the
traditional test presuming the validity of zoning ordinances, the court
nevertheless held that certain land uses in Michigan had been placed in
a kind of "preferred or favored status,"65 and that, when such a status
is involved, the burden of proving the reasonableness of the zoning
ordinance shifts to the municipality." Moreover, the court said that
mobile homes, as a housing resource for low-income people, enjoy this
favored status. Since the City's justifications for its ordinance were
insufficient, the zoning was invalidated. Like the Pennsylvania court in
National Land, the Michigan court stated that people have a right to
be able to obtain decent housing at a price they can afford and that
zoning whose primary purpose is to exclude a certain group of people
is invalid. "7 Michigan's68"favored status" has since been extended to
multiple-unit dwellings.
These decisions did not involve comprehensive master plans, however, and the court in Bristow intimated that a well-reasoned, flexible
plan might enable municipalities to meet the burden of proving that
zoning excluding favored status housing was reasonable. 9 In Kropf v.
City of Sterling Heights, 7 however, even a master plan did not meet the
municipality's burden because the court found no specific reason to
prohibit multiple dwellings in the particularlocation at issue.
In Cohen v. Charter Township of Canton,7' on the other hand, the
court upheld the prohibition of a particular mobile home park because
the municipality had not only adopted a comprehensive master plan, but
62. See Westwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of South Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424, 244
N.E.2d 700, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1969).
63. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
64. 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322 (1971).
65. Id. at 210, 192 N.W.2d at 324.
66. For a general discussion see Feiler, Metropolitanization and Land-Use Parochialism-Toward a JudicialAttitude, 69 MICH. L. REV. 655 (1971).
67. Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 217, 192 N.W.2d 322, 327-28 (1971).
68. Simmons v. City of Royal Oak, 38 Mich. App. 496, 196 N.W.2d 811 (1972).
69. 35 Mich. App. at 219-20, 192 N.W.2d at 329.
70. 41 Mich. App. 21, 199 N.W.2d 567 (1972).
71. 38 Mich. App. 680, 197 N.W.2d 101 (1972).
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had provided three mobile home areas in the town and in fact had the
largest number of mobile home sites of any community in southeastern
Michigan.
Lower courts in New Jersey 2 and Illinois 73 have also recognized
housing needs and invalidated local exclusionary zoning ordinances.
Southern Burl County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,7 a New
Jersey case that invalidated a zoning regulation-specifically because,
by prohibiting low-income, multifamily housing, it effectively prevented
slum residents living in the township from relocating into decent housing-is particularly important. The regulation in question used a combination of limitations on the number of bedrooms and a minimum apartment room size. Most significantly, the court ordered the township to
ascertain the number of low- and moderate-income units needed to meet
anticipated township needs and then to adopt a plan for satisfying these
needs.
Because of the traditional judicial reluctance to invalidate zoning
ordinances on due process grounds, a number of commentators have
suggested applying equal protection principles.75 Equal protection principles lay at the heart of the Mt. Laurel decision, but the effectiveness
of this approach in other jurisdictions remains open to question. 7
Even when courts are receptive to doctrines that annul exclusionary
zoning practices, however, the task of bringing suit and proving an
invidious and improper basis for each municipality's zoning regulation
is enormous; moreover, individual cases may consume years of preparation.
If the central city black ghettos are to be dispersed and blacks are
72. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. II, 283 A.2d 353
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1971) (lot size and floor space limitations held unconstitutional).
73. Lakeland Bluff, Inc. v. County of Will, 114 Ill. App. 2d 267, 252 N.E.2d 765 (1969)
(exclusion of mobile homes unconstitutional; shortage of low-income housing an "element" of
decision).
74. 119 N.J. Super. 164, 290 A.2d 465 (Super. Ct. 1972).
75. Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent,
21 STAN. L. REV. 767, 782-85 (1969); Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 1645, 1649-50 (197 1); Note, ConstitutionalLaw-EqualProtection-Zoning-SnobZoning: Must a Man's Home Be a Castle?,69 MICH. L. REV. 339, 342 (1970); Note, The Constitutionalit), of Local Zoning, 79 YALE L.J. 896, 897 (1970).
76. In James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), the Supreme Court sustained a provision of
the California constitution requiring community approval before low-rent projects could be constructed. Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun argued in their dissent that poor people were
being deprived of equal protection. For the zoning implications of Valtierrasee Lefcoe, The Public
Housing Referendum Case, Zoning, and the Supreme Court, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1384 (1971). See
also Comment, California'sLow-Income Housing Referendum: EqualProtectionand the Problem
of Economic Discrimination, 8 COLUM. L.J. & SOC. PROB. 135 (1972).
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to be given an equal opportunity to live in suburban areas, zoning
regulations that exclude low-rent, multifamily housing, the only economically feasible source of new housing for the poor, will have to be
invalidated. This is particularly important in light of the trend of industry dispersal and removal to suburban communities that presently deny
residential access to low-income, i.e. black, industrial workers. The
traditional position that multifamily, low-income housing erodes the tax
base and places burdens on the community's services and facilities is
morally indefensible when a community has acquired a tax-generating
industry but demands that other communities assume the burdens of
providing adequate housing and municipal services for the necessary
workers.
III.

PROBLEMS OF INTEGRATION, DECENT HOUSING, AND FREEDOM
OF CHOICE

A.

What is Integration?

Most cases and statutes speak of integration as if the word carried
an understood, definite meaning. This is true only to the extent that
integration clearly implies some mixture of black and white; the actual
proportions of the mixture, however, are rarely even discussed. At one
time, Public Housing Authority statistics classified any project with one
or more blacks as integrated." Very few people would be content with
this definition today. Nevertheless, it is not clear what proportion constitutes an acceptable level of integration or whether a black majority
ever means integration in the minds of most people. For example, many
consider a neighborhood integrated if twenty percent of the population
is black, but few would concur in that characterization if only twenty
percent were white.
Social scientists have developed a "tipping point" theory based
upon the belief that, when the proportion of blacks in a building or
neighborhood reaches a critical level-usually given as approximately
40 percent-the building or neighborhood will "tip" and, unless drastic
measures are taken, will fairly quickly become a black, segregated
building or neighborhood. If this belief is accurate, it is virtually impossible to have a permanently integrated building or neighborhood with a
black majority.
The tipping theory suggests that one definition of integration applicable to housing, might be that a mixed building or neighborhood is
77. Luttrell, The Public Housing Administration and Discriminationin Federally Assisted
Low-Rent Housing, 64 MICH. L. REv. 871 (1966).
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"integrated" when, as blacks or whites move out, other blacks or whites
will move in, thus keeping a fairly stable over-all percentage ratio between the two groups-a condition that probably requires a white majority.78 This raises further problems, however. Most people would agree
that a town in which whites live in one district and blacks live in another
is not integrated; but what about a neighborhood having alternating
"black" and "white" streets? And what about a white neighborhood
with an all-black, multifamily housing project in its midst? Most public
housing site selection cases aim toward exactly this type of integration.79
Other fundamental problems are raised by the white majority requirement inherent in the concept of integration, because a dispersed
black minority destroys rights, needs, and desires to develop a political
base, live in a familiar neighborhood," and exercise freedom of choice
in regard to housing. Moreover, what impact upon the psychic wellbeing of black people results from saying that all people are equal, but
some are more equal because whites must predominate for a building
or neighborhood to be really integrated? In effect, positing the achivement of integration as defined above to be the primary housing goal
places the rights of blacks at the mercy of whites who refuse to live in a
mixed environment as a minority and makes "integration" a one-way
street with blacks moving into white communities, but not vice versa.
The extent to which the law should cater to these prejudices and rule
that public authorities must prevent tipping under an "affirmative duty
to integrate" is questionable. What is the legal position of a housing
applicant who is refused an apartment because the project or neighborhood is already racially balanced? Does the fourteenth amendment condone a denial based solely upon the applicant's race?
B.

The "Benign Quota"

Racial quotas normally are illegal and unconstitutional because
their very concept implies racially based exclusion once the quota is
filled. Since racial integration does not happen spontaneously, however,
there has been increasing discussion of the propriety of "benign" quotas
that foster integration. At some point in applying the quota, however,
78. The introduction to the latest HUD regulations governing site selection and project
approval, for example, states that proposed housing to be built in racially mixed areas will receive
an "adequate" rather than a "superior" rating because they might cause the proportion of minority
to nonminority residents to increase significantly and contribute to growing minority concentration. HUD Rules and Reg., 37 Fed. Reg. 204 (1972).
79. See cases and materials cited notes 74-76 supra.
80. "To create an integrated distribution of the population over 86 per cent of all blacks
would have to move from their present residences." Note, supra note 26, at 269.
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someone-either black or white-will be excluded because of his race.
Some argue, on the other hand, that minimum quotas are necessary for
integration to occur, because there will frequently be sufficient qualified

whites, as well as blacks, available to fill all vacancies in existing white
areas. Further, when a new building or housing development opens,
unless a quota is alloted for blacks-depending upon the original neighborhood composition-it may become all white or all black. Moreover,
given the tipping theory, unless a maximum quota is set for blacks, any
integration may rapidly become segregation because the whites will

leave, driven out by their own fears of what they believe will be the
terrible consequences of living among a black majority.
Commentators have written at length on the equality and desirability of benign quotas,8' but the constitutional issue remains undecided,"

and existing judicial pronouncements provide only doubtful authority. 3
Although quotas determining racial mixtures have been sustained as

appropriate tools to remedy past employment discrimination,84 until
recently the issue has not arisen within the housing context. Most housing decisions have centered around discriminatory site or tenant selection, the classic example of the latter situation being the exclusion of a
black and the subsequent placement of a white in a basically all-white

building or neighborhood. Therefore, there has been little occasion in
the housing area to confront the question of a quota.
Otero v. New York City Housing Authority,8 5 in which black former site tenants sought entry into public housing that replaced an earlier

slum where they had lived, directly raised as an issue the validity of a
"benign" quota (although not so named), because the Authority argued
that its affirmative duty to integrate overrode the site tenants' priority
right to return. The Authority argued that the building in question must
be racially balanced, not merely that the building and surrounding re81.

Hellerstein, The Benign Quota, Equal Protection, and 'The Rule in Shelley's Case." 17

RUTGERS L. REV. 531 (1963); Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the

Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363 (1966); Navasky, Tile Benevolent Housing Quota, 6 How. L.J. 30 (1960); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82
HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1104-20 (1969).
82. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 81, at 1118 & n.233.
83. See, e.g., Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 182 F. Supp. 681, 707 (N.D. Ill.), modified,
286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961); Lakewood Homes, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 258 N.E.2d 470
(Ct. C.P., Allen Co., Ohio), modified, 25 Ohio App. 2d 125, 267 N.E.2d 595 (1971).
84. See, e.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
See generally Leiken, Preferential Treatment in the Skilled Building Trades: An Analysis of the
Philadelphia Plan, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 84 (1970); O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing
the Access of Minority Groups to Higher Education, 80 YALE L.J. 699 (1971).
85. Civil No. 72-1733 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 8, 1973).
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newal housing had to be integrated when considered as a whole. On this
basis, the Authority tried to alter the building's projected racial balance
from 80 percent black and 20 percent white to 40 percent black and 60
percent white.
The district court held that the Authority could not deprive the
displaced blacks of their right to return in order to integrate the buildings. The court pointed to the irony of using the affirmative duty to

integrate contained in the Fair Housing Act of 1968, which had been
enacted to aid blacks in obtaining decent housing, as a reason for ex-

cluding them. 6 The court held that this result was clearly not within the
intention of Congress. Furthermore, the court concluded that overriding
the black's priority right to return, a benefit established under a
NYCHA regulation, would violate the equal protection clause as the

denial of a governmental benefit on the basis of race. 7
If Otero is upheld, it can be used to strike down benign quotas, at
least when they operate to deny blacks access to decent housing. The

opinion, however, does contain language indicating that quotas may be
sustained when they exclude whites to leave room for blacks.8
C.

How Absolute the "Duty To Integrate"?

In January 1972, HUD adopted new guidelines for evaluating requests for public housing-related funds that put renewed emphasis on
the need to find housing sites for low-income, black families outside
ghetto and already well-integrated areas. 89 Since the government sets

unrealistically low standards for total unit costs, however, land acquisition costs must be kept so low that projects in areas which would receive
a "superior" rating-nonintegrated white neighborhoods-become too
expensive for public or subsidized housing.
Moreover, HUD discourages projects in integrated areas because
86. id. at 27-28.
87. Id. at 31.
88. The decision could be of substantial importance to blacks. A major source of opposition
to urban renewal has always been that poor blacks lose their homes and that the new housing is
for the middle class, that is whites. If the court had held that the Housing Authority could prevent
displaced blacks from entering the few low-income apartments built in order to bring in whites to
"integrate" the building, it would have created but another reason to oppose urban renewal. Urban
renewal, however, is the only federal program that encourages an orderly and rational development
of slum areas. It can, therefore, be of great value if properly used.
89. For example, a proposal is rated "superior" if it "will provide opportunities for minorities for housing outside existing areas of minority concentration and outside areas which are
already substantially racially mixed." A proposal will receive a "poor" rating if it will increase
substantially the "proportion of minority residents in an area which is not one of minority concentration, but which is racially mixed." 37 Fed. Reg. 205-09 (1972).
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of its fears of tipping and creating another ghetto. In fact, HUD's most
recent regulation encourages building low-income housing in either allwhite or ghetto neighborhoods.
Given the difficulties inherent in this approach, HUD's action
could effectively halt the construction of low-income housing." If having
decent housing for all-regardless of where it may be located-is an
important social goal, then either the regulation or the cost formula
must be altered. Both solutions will further require facing the issue of
the blacks' right to remain in a black community and to have decent
housing built for them there.
An absolute position on integration would require dispersal of
blacks from communities in which they have lived for many years.9
Moreover, it implies a permanent black minority relationship since
blacks constitute only slightly more than ten percent of the total population.
Quotas and regulations that force the dispersal of blacks in the
name of integration treat human beings as mere numbers or pawns.
They erode the reality of a "community" or a "neighborhood" and
disregard the reality that people exist, not in a vacuum, but in a tangle
of personal, social, and economic relationships reflected by special communities that develop from group interactions. These communities may
be alive and special; many inhabitants have an attachment they are
unwilling to surrender in pursuit of integration.
A free nation must provide some room for differences, some room
for minorities to be able to build a small, decent community and call it
their own. At the same time there must be an opportunity for everyone
to live wherever he desires, regardless of the racial or economic prejudices of the majority.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The United States has come a long way, and yet a very short way,
from separate, but "equal" housing arrangements. Unfortunately, in
great measure because of policies and programs followed by the federal
government and local communities, the United States is perhaps in fact,
although not in law, more segregated in its housing patterns now than
90. Projects in ghettos are supposed to be built pursuant to a plan providing for a similar
housing in white areas, so that minorities have the choice of a wide range of locations. 37 Fed.
Reg. 205-09 (1972). See, e.g., Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
91. HUD imposed a moratorium on all federally subsidized housing programs in January
of 1973. N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1973, § 1, at 1, col. 1, at 19, col. 4.
92. Note, supra note 26, at 269-71.
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at the turn of the century. Much more must be done to make decent
housing available everywhere to all races at all income levels, so that
everyone can make a truly free choice to live in either an integrated or
a ghetto-but not slum-community.

